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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1611 
 ___________ 
 
KUMAR CHANDANA PERERA; 
LAKSHIKA KRISHANTHI JAYASURIYA; 
SEMALI DULYANA PERERA, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-009-080, A089-009-081, and A089-009-082) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Susan Roy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2013 
 Before:  VANASKIE, SCIRICA and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 







 The petitioners were previously before us when we denied their petition for review 
of an adverse asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
order of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  See Perera v. Att’y Gen., 
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447 F. App’x 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential per curiam).  In May 2012, almost 
two years after the BIA entered its order, the family filed a motion to reopen based on 
their fear of being persecuted or tortured in Sri Lanka for having sought asylum in the 
United States.  They claimed to have become aware of the purported risk they faced in 
February 2012 when attempting to renew travel documents.  See, e.g., Administrative 
Record (A.R.) 26–27, 142.  Attached to the lengthy motion were more than a hundred 
pages of supporting exhibits.  See A.R. 81–199. 
 The BIA examined this new evidence in a thorough opinion, concluding that the 
petitioners had failed to show that “these conditions did not exist before and at the time of 
their hearing, such that they represent changed conditions or circumstances since that 
time.”  A.R. 7.1  More specifically, the submissions indicated that “the Sri Lankan 
government continues to use mistreatment, including torture, and the victims of torture 
include individuals who returned from abroad, which in turn may include returned 
asylum seekers.”  A.R. 8 (emphasis added).  The motion to reopen was thus denied. 
This timely, counseled petition for review followed.  We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen, but our review is 
deferential; we will reverse only if the BIA abused its discretion, such that its decision 
was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 202 
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 The BIA also decided that the petitioners had not made a prima facie showing of their 
entitlement to relief, and separately declined to reopen sua sponte.  See A.R. 11.  The prima facie 
determination is not relevant to our analysis.  Also, sua sponte relief has not been briefed and is 
thus not before us, Dwumaah v. Att’y Gen., 609 F.3d 586, 589 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010), but we would 
be without jurisdiction to review the discretionary decision in any event.  See Desai v. Att’y 
Gen., 695 F.3d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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(3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).   
 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a single motion to reopen removal 
proceedings may be filed within 90 days of the entry of a final order of removal.  8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); Desai, 695 F.3d at 269–70.  Both the statute and the 
relevant regulations provide an exception for motions based on evidence of changed 
country conditions “arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal 
has been ordered,” but only “if [the] evidence is material and was not available and 
would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  “Therefore, if the [alien] 
presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been 
presented during the hearing before the IJ, his motion can be considered, even if there has 
been a prior motion to reopen or the motion is beyond the 90-day time limit for filing.”  
Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007).  A showing of changed country 
conditions is a threshold consideration to an analysis of the full merits of the motion to 
reopen.  Id. at 312; see also Ni v. Holder, 715 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2013); Khan v. 
Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 498 (3d Cir. 2012).  “The burden of proof on a motion to 
reopen is on the alien to establish eligibility for the requested relief.”  Pllumi v. Att’y 
Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)).
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 The petitioners contend that Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 
(1988), established that “the BIA may deny a Motion to Reopen based on changed country 
conditions on three grounds.”  Pet’rs’ Br. 5.  Although Abudu did construe the predecessor 
regulation to the one involved in this case, 8 C.F.R. § 3.2, it did not and could not have involved 
the changed-country-conditions exception to the time and number limits on motions to reopen, 
which were enacted after Abudu was decided.  See, e.g., Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 236 
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 At the outset, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 
affidavit used by the Sri Lankan consulate to determine asylum status did not amount to a 
changed circumstance.  Even assuming that the presence of the affidavit was in fact 
material to the petitioners’ applications—a proposition that is by no means clear—the 
BIA was within its discretion to point out the lack of any indication that such an inquiry 
was, in fact, a change from the circumstances existing during the original asylum 
application process.  The petitioners argue that the BIA asked them to “prove a negative” 
by showing that there was no such previous declaration, but the burden was theirs, and 
the lack of available evidence does not mean that the BIA’s decision was either unfair or 
invalid.  Cf. Moosa v. Holder, 644 F.3d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing alien’s 
ability to introduce current country reports and affidavits describing past conditions).
3
  
 The same analysis extends to the BIA’s consideration of whether the new 
                                                                                                                                                             
(6th Cir. 2011); Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 118 F.3d 1034, 1040–41 & n.8 (5th Cir. 
1997).  This failure to distinguish between the threshold requirement of demonstrating changed 
country conditions and the analysis pertinent to the merits of a motion to reopen is a common 
theme throughout the petitioners’ briefs.  See, e.g., Pet’rs’ Br. 25–26 (relying upon standard in 
Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 560 (3d Cir. 2004), which dealt with a timely motion to reopen). 
3
 Although it does not affect our decision today, we followed the instructions for obtaining the 
consular materials discussed in the BIA opinion cited on page eleven of the petitioners’ opening 
brief.  We were not able to find on the Sri Lankan consular website the exact affidavit that is 
presented by the petitioners, but we were able to access the passport application.  Through the 
use of the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine,” which allows users to browse versions of 
pages and documents as they existed at various points in history, we were able to determine that 
questions pertaining to applications for asylum have been a longstanding feature of the 







documents showed a changed risk of torture or mistreatment for returning asylum 
applicants as a category.  As the agency made abundantly clear, conditions are far from 
ideal, and some returnees risk mistreatment—especially those affiliated with the LTTE 
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).  See A.R. 7.  The BIA surveyed the evidence and 
saw no material change; and while the petitioners disagree with this assessment, they 




 The petitioners also argue that the BIA’s decision was irrational, because the 
agency inexplicably departed from prior cases presenting nearly identical facts.  See, e.g., 
Pet’rs’ Br. 21–22.  To the extent that the petitioners rely on unpublished BIA decisions, 
“unpublished, single-member BIA decisions have no precedential value, do not bind the 
BIA, and therefore do not carry the force of law except as to those parties for whom the 
opinion is rendered.”  De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 350 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Furthermore, it appears that the BIA was adjudicating a timely motion to reopen in the 
case cited, as the agency explicitly held that, if considered as a motion for 
reconsideration, the petitioner’s submission would have been untimely.  See A.R. 177.  
Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (establishing a 30-day period for filing reconsideration 
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 The Government contends that the “changed circumstance” advanced by the petitioners is 
simply a change in personal circumstances (due to having applied for asylum) and could not 
support a motion to reopen in this context. As the Government acknowledges, the case it cites for 
that proposition, Anandarajah v. Att’y Gen., 352 F. App’x. 667, 672 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam), 
is nonprecedential and not binding.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7.  But in any event, the petitioners 
claim that attitudes in Sri Lanka have changed towards failed asylum seekers; a change in 
personal circumstances that is accompanied by a change in country conditions could be a basis 
for reopening.  Cf. Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Jin v. Mukasey, 
538 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
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motions), with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (establishing a 90-day period for filing a motion 
to reopen).  Even fact patterns that may be “nearly identical” can nonetheless lead to 
different outcomes in a markedly different procedural posture. 
 Finally, the petitioners assert that the BIA denied them due process by considering 
a document outside of the record without allowing them to respond to it.  We agree with 
the Government that the petitioners have not shown substantial prejudice.  See Delgado-
Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010).  Also, the report in question 
was dated March 7, 2012; the petitioners’ motion to reopen, by contrast, was dated May 
7, 2012.  See A. R. 80.  This timing suggests that the petitioners could have been aware 
of the report by the time they submitted their motion, and they could have asked the BIA 
to reconsider its decision. 
 For the foregoing reasons, and because the petitioners’ challenge to the BIA’s 
decision is otherwise without merit, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion 
by denying the motion to reopen.  We will deny the petition for review of the BIA’s 
decision. 
 
